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Appellant submits this Reply to the brief of the Salt Lake
County Mental Health Appellees (hereinafter "SLCMH").
I.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
SLCMH's "issues" punctuate its contradictory approach to this
case.

SLCMH casts the "issues" as legal questions but spends its

brief resolving the "issues" by construing the "facts" in its
favor.

While this approach acknowledges the issues are fact-

dependent , it is inappropriate to review a summary judgment that
Appellant opposed.
The statement of the "duty" issue by SLCMH highlights the
incongruous approach. SLCMH asserts the issue is whether the lower
court erred in finding "no duty."
commentators

that have examined

By comparison, the cases and
the

"duty" arising

from the

relationship between psychotherapists and patients explicitly rely
upon the facts in evidence to determine if a duty arises for the
benefit of another.

Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Del.

Supr. 1988) (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 37 at 236 (5th Ed. 1984)).
The

material

facts, when

considered

in

the

light most

favorable to the Appellant, support an affirmative duty owed to
Shaundra

Higgins

because

the

facts

establish

a

"special

relationship" between SLCMH and Trujillo as well as its "control"
of Trujillo.

In addition, SLCMHfs broad based obligation as a

mental health provider is sufficient to impose a duty for the

-I-

benefit of Shaundra Higgins, Appellant's daughter. Naidu v. Laird,
539 A.2d at 1073.
In recognition that there is a duty, SLCMH proposes three
additional

ff

issues" to avoid liability to Kathy Higgins:

(1)

whether Kathy Higgins1 individual claim for emotional distress is
barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1,
et seq. (1953, as amended); (2) whether Kathy Higgins1 individual
claim is barred by not sending a notice of claim under the
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953, as
amended); or, (3) whether Kathy Higgins1 individual claim is barred
by her purported

failure to state a claim for infliction of

emotional distress.

This. Reply will address these "issues" even

though the trial court did not rule on them.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SLCMHfs ninety-three paragraph Statement of Facts ignores the
well-accepted principle that disputed material facts render summary
judgment inappropriate.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Critical "facts"

set forth by SLCMH in the court below were disputed.
1983.]

[R at 1931-

Those facts are still disputed, are not "material facts,"

or represent legal conclusions.
1

The following fact paragraphs "realleged" by SLCMH in its
brief were specifically disputed below: 16, 17, 19, 22, 34, 37,
45-47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 64, 70, 72, 81-83. Other fact paragraphs
"realleged" in the brief were admitted in the trial court only with
the addition of necessary material facts to make the "fact"
statements accurate: 28-33, 39, 43, 44, 53, 58-61, 63, 68, 69, 71,
75. The following fact paragraphs are now raised in the brief of
SLCMH for the first time and could not be responded to below: 2527, 73, 76-78, 88, 90 and 91.
Similarly, the following fact
-2-

The

following

facts, in addition to those set forth in

Appellant's opening brief, must be considered in the light most
favorable to Appellant.
(Utah 1989).
decision

Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188

The facts require a reversal of the lower court's

because

they

establish,

inter

alia,

a

"special

relationship" and SLCMH's "control" of Trujillo.
1. Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had
an

extensive

and

well-documented

psychological

history,

characterized by a major mental illness, schizophrenia, as well as
organic brain dysfunction and marginal intelligence.

[Appellant's

Brief, pages 7-13; Appellee's Brief, fact paragraphs 21, 22, 61 and
77. ]
2. Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had
an extensive, well-documented

history of crime and violence,

including a very similar prior stabbing. [Appellant's Brief, pages
13-16; Appellee's Brief, fact paragraphs 25-38.]
3.

Trujillo, at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had been a

patient of SLCMH, on either a voluntary or involuntary basis, for
almost nine years. One involuntary placement occurred in February
1982 and ran through February of 1983 and resulted from courtordered

sentences

that

placed

Trujillo

into

SLCMH's

care.

[Appellant's Brief, pages 9-11, 13-24; Appellee's Brief, fact
paragraphs 24, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, and 63.]

paragraphs in the SLCMH brief were not alleged below or call for
legal conclusions and are not facts at all: 1-8, 10-15, 26.
-3-

4.
agreed

SLCMH was consulted about the sentences, and specifically
with

probation

authorities

to

provide

mental

health

treatments three days a week to Trujillo, to provide for a weekly
visit with her primary therapist "Sheryl Steadman," and to provide
medications to Trujillo.

[Appellant's Brief, page 15; Steadman

Depo. at 90-91; R. at 2371.]
5.

SLCMH did not provide the other court-ordered conditions

and erroneously advised probation authorities at the end of a oneyear period that Trujillo was "taking her medications and attending
her treatment sessions" and that it would "continue to monitor her
medication and urge her to attend therapy."

Probation officials

repeated these erroneous representations to the sentencing courts
and recommended Trujillofs probation be terminated.

[Appellant's

Brief, page 15; R. at 1733.]
6.

The courts terminated the probation [R. at 1735] and

Trujillo decompensated, causing her family and Trujillo to seek
treatment

and

care

from

violence.

[Appellant's Brief, pages 16-17; Affids. of Trujillo's

family; R. at 1701-1713.]

SLCMH

to control

her psychosis and

Appellant's experts indicate that at

this time, and through the date of the stabbing, Trujillo presented
an unacceptably high level of risk that she would act violently
toward herself and others.
7.

[R. at 1759-1767, 2123-2126.]

On February 25, 1984, Trujillo's family specifically

requested SLCMH hospitalize Trujillo at its inpatient unit, the
University Medical Center, because she was psychotic, had wounds to
her wrists, and the family could not handle her.
-4-

SLCMH referred

Trujillo for an "evaluation" to the Medical Center but told the
family that "no County beds were available."

[R. at 1893.]

The

record demonstrates there was not a limit on the number of county
beds.

[Erickson Depo. at 109; R. at 1703-1704, 1713, 1893 and

2380. ]
8.

Trujillo and her mother, in reliance upon and at the

direction of SLCMH, went to the Medical Center and again requested
to be hospitalized at the SLCMH inpatient unit. [R. at 1701-1706.]
Even though Trujillo was openly psychotic, suffering from dangerous
hallucinations

and

complaining

of

self-inflicted

wounds, the

Medical Center repeated the County line that Trujillo could not be
admitted due to bed shortages.

[R. at 1125.]

The Medical Center

then sent Trujillo to a SLCMH "group home" known as the Adult
Residential Treatment Unit ("ARTU"). Appellant's experts indicate
the failure to admit Trujillo and the referral to ARTU fell below
appropriate standards of care for Trujillo, who needed an extended
hospitalization.
9.

ARTU

[R. at 1668, 1761-1766.]
was

a

minimally

therapeutic

setting

adequately qualified or sufficiently available staff.
an

appropriate

substitute

Trujillo required.

for the

[R. at 1665-1671.]

in-patient

without

It was not

hospitalization

Trujillo was sent to this

facility, however, for the explicit reason she would be seen by
Sheryl Steadman, her SLCMH "primary therapist."

[R. at 1125.]

Sheryl Steadman never saw Trujillo while she was at ARTU and
candidly admitted

in her deposition that she did not see or

evaluate Trujillo and did not know "whether hospitalization was
-5-

appropriate."

[Steadman Depo. at 138-139; R. at 1668, 1761-1766,

2371. ]
10.

Even though Trujillo's family did not believe the group

home would help her, they abided by the explicit instructions of
SLCMH and took Trujillo to ARTU because they could not afford a
private hospital. Upon their arrival at ARTU, the family told ARTU
that Trujillo was just there pending a bed at the inpatient unit
and Trujillo herself requested hospitalization after having been at
ARTU.

[Romero Depo. at 82; Steadman Depo. at 138; R. at 1701-1712;

2371.]
11.

Trujillo was never seen by her "responsible physician,"

Dr. William Kuentzel, while at ARTU.

Instead, she was assigned to

Larry Romero, who was not qualified but formulated Trujillo1s
treatment plan. The "plan" did not evaluate or diffuse Trujillofs
propensities for violence [R. at 1761-1766] and the only licensed
doctor to see Trujillo, Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time psychiatrist with
a restricted role of prescribing medications, found Trujillo during
this time to be "erratic," "non-adaptive," "labile," and displaying
a complete "lack of insight."

[Ely Depo. at 22; R. at 2371.] Dr.

Ely recommended a substantial increase in dosages of medication to
control Trujillo but the increased dosages were never administered.
[Stevens Depo. at 36; R. at 2382.]
12.

ARTU returned Trujillo back to Trujillo1s family and the

environment of the earlier stabbing.

Trujillo1s family took her

back because she "had no other place to go."

-6-

[R. at 1710.]

13. Trujillo was placed as a patient in the "evening-weekend"
program operated by SLCMH upon her release.

Larry Romero was

assigned as Trujillo's therapist for the program but did not see
Trujillo after she left ARTU.

Trujillo missed many of the

"evening-weekend" sessions, including every session for the week
Shaundra was stabbed.

In fact, Shaundra was stabbed at the very

time Trujillo was to be in a treatment session.
14.

The hallucinations that afflicted Trujillo continued from

the time Trujillo left ARTU until the stabbing.
2235.]

[R. at 1757.]

[R. at 1708-1711,

Trujillo presented an unacceptably high level of risk

during this time that she would act violently toward others and
SLCMH should have known, by a proper evaluation and diagnosis of
Trujillo, of the unacceptably high level of risk.

[R. at 1761-

1767; 2123-2126.]
15.

SLCMH failed to properly assess and treat the risk, in

violation of the appropriate standard of care, because, among other
things, it did not review medical records; it did not involve
experienced

and qualified personnel to evaluate and diagnose

Trujillo; it failed to provide meaningful psychiatric intervention;
it allowed medication to be prescribed by non-psychiatrists which
medication was far less than that recommended by SLCMHfs own
doctors to control Trujillo; it failed to evaluate or diffuse
Trujillo's propensities for violence; and, it failed to voluntarily
or involuntarily hospitalize Trujillo for extended periods. [R. at
1761-1767; 2123-2126.]

-7-

16.

As a result of these failures, Trujillo1s psychosis and

violence continued.
request

and

her

On April 10, 1984, after having had her

family's

plea

for hospitalization

rejected,

Trujillo violently stabbed Shaundra Higgins, a neighbor. In an indepth interview by psychologists at the Utah State Hospital,
Trujillo indicated she stabbed Shaundra at the direction of an
inner voice, after thinking

of an imagined

incident between

Trujillo1s daughter and Shaundra, about which Trujillo had been
brooding for six months.
17.

[R. at 2067-2068.]

Kathy Higgins was standing in the family kitchen, which

was close to the location of the stabbing, when she heard a "bloodcurdling scream."

She ran into her back yard and saw her daughter

fall, get up, and fall again.

Shaundra then "collapsed in her

arms" and Shaundrafs eyes "rolled back in her head." Kathy Higgins
"realized she had been stabbed" and now suffers from nightmares and
anxiety from the emotional distress of having her only child so
brutally assaulted.

[Depo. of Kathy Higgins at 30-35; 48-50; 72-

90; R. at 2372. ]
III.
ARGUMENT
A.

DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

SLCMHfs assertion that there were no disputed material facts
belies the extensive memoranda SLCMH filed, and the nearly fifty
pages of "disputed facts" set forth by the Appellant in the trial
court.

Many of the disputed facts are central to the issue of

whether a "special relationship" existed between the SLCMH and
-8-

Trujillo and whether SLCMH controlled or had the "right or ability"
to control Trujillo•

The existence of these factual disputes

precluded summary judgment.

Doe v. Arquelles/ 716 P.2d 279, 280-

281 (Utah 1985).
The Court need only examine the SLCMH brief to see there are
key facts in dispute. Appellant, in her opening Brief, identified
the portions of the record containing the fact disputes and set
forth the facts, when construed in her favor, that establish
"duty."

SLCMH,

ignoring

this

principle,

asserts

93

fact

paragraphs, many of which are not material or are disputed.
The relevance of fact disputes in this case becomes clear when
considering the "duty" issue.

For instance, as part of its

argument on duty, SLCMH writes at page 30 of its brief:
The undisputed, facts show that Caroline
Trujillo was always treatment resistant and
had little history of violence prior to her
assault on Shaundra Higgins.
This

argument

contradicts

the

extensive

criminal

and

psychological history of Trujillo and the recorded demands by
Trujillo and her family for hospitalization.2

The "duty" issue

cannot be examined without facts, and when the facts are construed
in Appellant's favor, it is undeniable that "duty" exists.

SLCMH even contradicts the opinions of the County Attorney
who prosecuted Trujillo, as set forth in a post-sentence report
authored by Jack D. Bowers, an AP&P investigator, in which it is
written that the County Attorney stated "he did not believe
[Trujillo] would ever be well enough to be paroled," that the
"attack on Shaundra Higgins was the second unprovoked attack she
made on people with a knife," and that "Trujillo was a very
dangerous person." [R. at 2031.]
-9-

B.

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED THAT IMPOSED A DUTY TO
PROPERLY TREAT AND EVALUATE TRUJILLO AND TAKE PRECAUTIONS
TO PROTECT OTHERS.

SLCMH erroneously contends at page 28 of its brief that there
was not a duty created by a "special relationship" between SLCMH
and Trujillo. SLCMH does not and cannot cite an analogous case for
this contention.
"special

Instead, SLCMH claims that there was not a

relationship"

because

Trujillo

was

outpatient on the day Shaundra Higgins was stabbed.
the argument is apparent.

a

"voluntary"
The falacy of

If the test is "voluntary" status, a

psychotherapist would never owe a duty to meet recognized standards
of care in treating a "voluntary" patient and protecting her
victims, no matter how violent and dangerous the patient, and no
matter how many people the psychotherapist knew she might stab.
Nor would the psychotherapist owe duty even though the reason the
patient was a dangerous "voluntary outpatient" was due to the
breach of the standard of care in failing to admit the patient who
is seeking hospitalization.
Neither the preeminent authorities on tort, nor the general
principles affording recovery for negligence in treating a violent
mental patient, support the SLCMH argument. Prosser & Keeton, The
Law of Torts, § 56, p. 384 (5th Ed. 1984), provides that hospitals
and psychotherapists may be liable for the acts of dangerous mental
patients.

The leading case to which the treatise refers is

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976), which imposed a duty to take reasonable precautions to
control a "voluntary" patient.

551 P.2d at 340. See, also, Naidu
-10-

v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073 (1988); Bradley Center, Inc. v.
Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (private mental health hospital
owed duty to control voluntary patient); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (V.A. hospital responsible
for voluntary

out-patient previously

in day care treatment);

Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1979) (psychotherapist
responsible for acts of voluntary out-patient).
Prosser's treatise was recently cited with approval by the
Utah Supreme Court in Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413
(Utah 1986), where the Court acknowledged certain relationships are
"special" as an "expression of policy."

726 P.2d 413, 418 (1986).

The majority of cases squarely hold the psychotherapist/patient
relationship is such a "special" relationship as a result of public
policy, and do not distinguish when the patient is "voluntary."
The

first

"policy"

the

courts

advocate

is

that

a

psychotherapist, as a specialist in medicine, should be compelled
to meet the accepted

standards of care established by other

practitioners in the profession. Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d
159, 162 (Wis. 1988); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 98 (Kan.
1983); Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (N.J. 1979); Tarasoff
v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 344-345
(Cal. 1976). This "policy" is particularly important in cases like
this where the Appellant's experts indicate the negligent diagnosis
and treatment, including the failure to hospitalize and properly
medicate Trujillo, constituted a cause-in-fact of harm to a third
party.

Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 162.
-11-

The second "policy" is that the judgment the therapist makes
in

diagnosing

emotional

and

psychological

disorders

and

in

predicting whether a patient presents a serious threat of danger of
violence is comparable to judgments which doctors regularly render
under accepted rules of responsibility.

But the courts do not

require the therapist to be a soothsayer.

Rather, the courts

merely require the therapist to exercise the degree of skill,
knowledge and care established by members of the profession. Naidu
v. Laird, 539 A.2d at 1674; Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at
167-168; Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 514; Lipari v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. , 497 F. Supp. at 192.

The Appellant's experts

establish SLCMH did not exercise the degree of skill, knowledge and
care established by members of the profession in this case.
The third "policy" the courts consider is the possible breach
of confidentiality of doctor-patient communications when a doctor
reports a violent patient to authorities.

While acknowledging a

need to protect confidential doctor-patient communications, the
courts

recognize

that

confidentiality

must

yield

where

the

interests and safety of another is threatened. See, e.g., Schuster
v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at 170; Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University

of California, 551 P.2d

at 347.

Of course, the

"confidentiality" problem does not arise in a case like this where
the patient seeks hospitalization.
The fourth "policy" is the principle of providing care for a
mental patient in the least restrictive environment.

Courts

uniformly reject the claim that imposition of "duty" will lead to
-12-

overcommitment and will discourage psychotherapists from treating
patients.

Empirical data indicates that therapists have not been

discouraged

from

treating

dangerous

patients, nor

have

they

increasingly used involuntary commitment proceedings. See Schuster
v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 175; Givelber, Bowers and Blitch,
Tarasoff, Myth and Reality:

An Empirical Study of Private Law In

Action, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 443, 473-76, 486; and Mills, Sullivan and
Eth, Protecting Third Parties: A Decade After Tarasoff, 144 Am. J.
Psych. 68, 69-70 (Jan. 1987).

Indeed, the imposition of duty to

protect third persons from the violent propensities of a patient is
consistent with ethical obligations perceived by psychotherapists
to govern their behavior notwithstanding any legal obligation.
See, e.g., Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d at 174; Lipari v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 192-93.
SLCMH does not address articulated public policy but relies on
dicta from Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1989)
to claim that courts decline to impose "duty" upon mental hospitals
where

"voluntary

patients" are

concerned.

Importantly, the

plaintiffs in Hokansen expressly avoided basing their claims on the
special relationship theory this case presents.

Id. at 378.

Moreover, Hokansen focused upon whether Kansas law imposed an
affirmative

duty

to

seek

an

involuntary

commitment.

The

involuntary commitment analysis is not necessary in this case since
Trujillo sought hospitalization.
Additionally, the "dicta" in Hokansen that "most" courts have
declined to extend duty to the "voluntary" patient circumstance is
-13-

superficial. Hokansen cites Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp.
999 (D. Md. 1982) for this proposition.

Hasenei acknowledged the

psychotherapist-patient relationship is a "special relationship"
and imposes duty when there is a right or ability to control the
patient's conduct.

541 F. Supp. at 1009-1010.

The court in

Hasenei then looked at duty under the facts after a full trial in
which the plaintiff's expert testified there was no basis to
involuntarily commit the assailant and the assailant expressed
"severe" hostility toward hospitalization.

541 F. Supp. at 1010.

By comparison, Trujillo sought and the standard of care required
hospitalization.

Hasenei recognized that in this circumstance

there is a duty to hospitalize and "establish" control.

541 F.

Supp. at 1012, fn. 23.3
Finally, the cases do-not require, as SLCMH claims, that there
be

"legal custody" over the patient.

Those cases requiring

"control" indicate it is not the product of forced custody, but a
characteristic

of the relationship between the mental health

provider and even a voluntary patient. This is carefully addressed
in the opinion of Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716,
aff'd, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982), which held the "patient-physician
relationship" can allow the psychotherapist

to

"control" the

Hokansen also cites Hinkleman v. Borgess Medical Center,
403 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. App. 1987) to claim there is no "duty" to
control a voluntary patient.
Hinkleman indicates that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship is "special," but chooses to
not impose duty as a result of facts that sharply contrast to this
case.
In Hinkleman, the patient had only two brief prior
encounters with the hospital and had purposely left the hospital
prior to the assault on a third person.
-14-

voluntary patient by exercising various degrees of authority over
the patient.

287 S.E.2d at 721 (citing Mcintosh v. Milano, 168

N.J. Super. 406, 403 A.2d 500 (1979); Rum River Lumber Co. v. State
of Maine, 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Supr. 1979); Lipari v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980)).
The facts show that SLCMH had the ability and did "control"
Trujillo in 1984. First, SLCMH refused to hospitalize Trujillo and
sent her to ARTU.
neighborhood

SLCMH then directed Trujillo into the Higgins

just before the stabbing.

SLCMH did this as a

provider of mental health services for the State Division of Mental
Health which had the responsibility to supervise the mentally ill.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-17-5, 64-7-7 (1953, as amended). Second, when
Trujillo was on probation

from 1982 until

1983, the medical

treatments provided by SLCMH, including a residential stay, were
"involuntary."
In addition, the Utah Mental Health statutes gave SLCMH the
legal right to control Trujillo.

A mental health facility can

exercise control over a voluntary patient to restrict her release.
Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-31 et seq. (1953, as amended).

Also, Utah

Code Ann. § 64-7-36 (1953, et seq.) provided for the involuntary
hospitalization of a patient, if necessary.
Trujillo was psychotic

Because Caroline

and had a well-documented

history of

violence, SLCMH owed a duty to exercise due care in its control but
failed

by, among

other ways, not admitting Trujillo

to its

inpatient unit for full and complete evaluation and treatment.
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Del. Supr. 1988).
-15-

This Court's opinion in Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1989) supports this conclusion.

In Owens, the Court recognized

that certain relationships are "special" and cited the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 315 (1964) upon which the majority of cases
rely to impose duty.

The Court also cited Petersen v. State, 671

P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983), where the Washington Supreme Court, citing
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 and the majority of cases
that support Appellant, held state psychotherapists have a duty to
protect victims of a patient where the therapist could or should
reasonably foresee that the risk engendered by the mental patientfs
condition would endanger others. Petersen at 237 (citing Semler v.
Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D. C , 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th
Cir. 1976); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194
(D. Neb. 1980); Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1046
(S.D. 1978)).
C.

THE DUTY WAS OWED TO KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS AND THE
PUBLIC DUTY RULE DOES NOT APPLY.

SLCMH also asserts it owed no duty because "there was no duty
owed to the public."

[Appellant's Brief at 33.]

SLCMH cites two

Utah cases, Obray v. Malmberq, 484 P.2d 160, (Utah 1971) (failure
of a sheriff to investigate a burglary held not actionable) and
Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984) (deputies owed no
duty

to

arrest

an

intoxicated

motorcyclist

prior

to

fatal

accident), to claim "duties owed to the public are not owed to
individuals."

[Appellee's Brief at 34.]

These cases are not psychotherapist cases and do not apply.
The so-called "public duty" rule arises in the corrections or law
-16-
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[Appellee's

The record clearly shows Trujillo had been a

patient of SLCMH for years, SLCMH was aware of her violent past,
and SLCMH knew she was decompensating.
SLCMHfs attempt to distinguish this case from the "duty to
warn" cases also does not help it.

Contrary to the SLCMH1 s

assertions, there is a fact question as to whether or not Shaundra
Higgins was

identifiable.

Trujillo

had been brooding about

Shaundra, her neighbor, for six months.

SLCMH did not interview

Trujillo about this or do anything to diffuse her violence.
Trujillo may well have revealed her preoccupation with Shaundra and
protective steps, including appropriate warnings, could have been
taken.
Therefore, the duty SLCMH breached was to take the actions and
necessary precautions in accordance with the standards of the
profession, to properly treat and evaluate Trujillo, and to protect
Shaundra Higgins.
1989);

See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.

Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073 (Del. Supr. 1988);

Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159, 172-73 (Wis. 1988); Petersen
v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1983).
Not one of the foregoing cases nor one Utah case limits duty
to "identified victims."

This Court has permitted claims for

injuries suffered by the public.
(Utah 1985).

Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279

In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989), the

Court referred to cases against municipalities for injuries to the
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patient while in jail); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 417
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding government mental hospital liable in
third party case for failing to properly advise court about
patient/criminal defendant's mental condition).
E.

KATHY HIGGINS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BECAUSE SHE FAILED
TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM.

SLCMH erroneously claims the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et. seq., required Kathy Higgins to file
a notice of claim on her own behalf. The Act in 1984 only required
notice for "essential" governmental functions. Schultz v. Conger,
755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988).

An essential governmental function is

one "which only government can perform."
widely

held

that

treating,

evaluating

jtd.
and

The courts have

hospitalizing

the

mentally ill can be performed by a private health care provider and
universally dismiss the assertion of governmental immunity to
defeat a victim's claims. See Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 241
(Wash. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D.
Neb. 1980); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
F.

APPELLANT'S CLAIMS DO NOT ARISE OUT OF FAILURE TO PERFORM
A DISCRETIONARY ACT.

SLCMH asserts that Count V of Appellant's Amended Complaint,
alleging a duty to hospitalize Trujillo, complains of the breach of
a discretionary act for which it is immune. Appellant asserts the
acts to not admit or commit Trujillo were not governmental and the
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply.
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The leading case is Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622,
624 (2d Cir. 1954), where Judge (later Justice) Harlen expressed
that the assault and battery exception did not bar suit for
negligence leading to an assault by a non-governmental employee.
See, also, Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968)
(permitting claim where assault by non-governmental employee);
Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).4
H.

APPELLANT KATHY HIGGINS HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

SLCMH further claims that Kathy Higgins does not have a cause
of action for infliction of emotional distress because she was not
present at the time Caroline Trujillo stabbed Shaundra, and was not
within the "zone of danger" required for this cause of action.
[Appellant's Brief at 41.]
The facts in this case indicate that Kathy Higgins heard her
daughter

scream,

collapsed.

saw

her

fall, and

then

caught

her

as she

Kathy, therefore, "witnessed" the stabbing which has

caused her emotional shock and trauma.

See Navaroff v. Superior

Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553 (1978) (mother
hearing but not seeing infant that had fallen into pool permitted
to have trial for emotional shock).
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) does not expressly
eliminate this claim.

Appellant acknowledges the majority of the

4

The reference by SLCMH to the case of Connell v. Tooele
City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) is inopposite. In that case, the
claims were for injuries arising out of false imprisonment by
Tooele City. Obviously, the physical conduct giving rise to the
complaint was committed by a governmental employee and the claim
was not by a third party.
-22-
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Perreira v . S t a t e , 7 6 8 P. 2d

1198 (Colo. 1989); Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis.
1988); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d at 1074 (Del. Supr. 1988).
Likewise, the claim of SLCMH that the potential for liability
would impose a "chilling affect upon the practice of mental health
disciplines" is without support.

The effect of this case will be

to impose the standard of care upon mental health professionals
that

all medical

professionals

must meet.

See Schuster v.

Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Wis. 1988); Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Mcintosh v.
Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1979).
Finally, the right sought to be protected is the right to
recover for personal injuries that have tragically impacted a young
girlfs life.

It is a "substantial right, not only of monetary

value but . . . fundamental to [Shaundra Higginsf] physical well
being and ability to live a decent life." Condemarin v. University
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 360 (Utah 1989) (citing Hunter v. North
Mason High School Dist., 539 P.2d 845, 848 (Wash. 1975).
The
procedure

Appellant
as

substantive

does

violating

effect

of

not

challenge

Article
the

I,

summary

the

Section
judgment

summary
11.

It

that

judgment
is

the

arbitrarily

deprives the Appellant of her constitutionally guaranteed remedy.
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). There
is no legitimate objective in carving out psychotherapists from
traditional

negligence

principles

that

impose

upon

medical

professionals the duty to meet recognized standards of care.
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CONCLUSION
For

foregoing

reasons, Appellant

request

Court

reverse
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